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TAKING (EQUAL VOTING) RIGHTS SERIOUSLY:
THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT AS
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION, AND THE
NEED FOR JUDGES TO R EMODEL THEIR
APPROACH TO AGE DISC RIMINATION IN
POLITICAL RIGHTS
Vikram David Amar*
This Essay explores the relationship between twentieth-century votingdiscrimination amendments and the Fifteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination
groundwork on which these later developments built. In particular, it examines ways
in which the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, whose text and ratification conversations
tightly track those of the Fifteenth Amendment, has been underimplemented, if not
completely ignored, in recent debates and cases that are ever-more crucial to the
meaning of political-rights equality under the Constitution. It ends by urging courts
to take more seriously the similarities between the Twenty-Sixth and Fifteenth
Amendments in adjudicating disputes involving facial or de facto age discrimination
in political rights realms.

The Reconstruction Amendments are designated by many as a
Second Founding. And that is not an inapt characterization; the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments together do mark
a new and sharply different constitutional creation, a chance to correct
course and redress grievous mistakes from America’s original
Constitution.
But as the root of the word “founding” (from the Latin
“fundus”—meaning bottom on which other matter accumulates or is
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built1) itself suggests, a second founding is also a second foundation;
not so much the replacement of something old with something else,
but the start or beginning (and not the end) of something new that is
not yet fully constructed. As the introduction to Kurt Lash’s helpful
new compilation of primary legal source materials surrounding the
Reconstruction observes, these postwar enactments didn’t just amend
the Constitution but reshaped it,2 altering the contours of the footing
on which future constitutional structures could and would be erected.
When one lays a foundation, one may never be sure how many
subsequent levels might be built, but the initial perimeter-beam layout
bears the weight of later additions, and thus often substantially affects
the shape, size, and material composition of these add-ons.
In this Essay, I explore the relationship between more recent
constitutional stories (double entendre intended) and the Fifteenth
Amendment’s antidiscrimination groundwork. In particular, I look at
the ways in which the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, whose text and
winning ratification arguments tightly track those of the Fifteenth
Amendment, has been underimplemented, if not completely ignored,
in recent debates and cases that are crucial to the meaning of politicalrights equality under the Constitution.3
I.

THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Void the Fifteenth Amendment Was Designed to Fill

In prior works I have begun analysis of the Fifteenth Amendment
by asking why the measure was necessary, as a legal matter, at all. In
other words, why was discrimination on the basis of race in voting not
already proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Some might say,
as did the second Justice Harlan in Oregon v. Mitchell, that the
enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment is itself “evidence that [those
responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment] did not understand [it]
to have accomplished such a result.”4 Evidence, yes, but perhaps not
conclusive evidence, given that the constitutional edifice doubtless
contains redundancy that serves to strengthen and reinforce stress
points, as Chief Justice Marshall pointed out in the Court’s seminal

1 Found,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/founding [https://perma.cc/A7RU-D68K].
2 See Kurt T. Lash, Introduction to 2 THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE
ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS 5–14 (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021) [hereinafter LASH, Vol. 2].
3 While my focus is the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and age discrimination, many of
my observations and arguments are applicable to the Nineteenth and (to a lesser extent
because of some textual divergence) Twenty-Fourth Amendments.
4 400 U.S. 112, 166 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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McCulloch v. Maryland5 opinion. Indeed, many modern cases and
commentators appear to suggest (or at least assume) that the
Fourteenth Amendment does address voting discrimination, even
though this reading of the Fourteenth Amendment ignores some
basics of reconstruction legal history, and in the process might tend to
marginalize (if not make irrelevant altogether) the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Within the Fourteenth Amendment, the two likeliest textual
candidates to proscribe voting discrimination are the Privileges and
Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses. But as a textual and
historical matter, both clauses are hard sells. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not prohibit race discrimination in the
franchise because voting was not among the “privileges or immunities
[of citizenship]” as that phrase was used in Article IV of the
Constitution or elsewhere in legal discourse.6
For example, a citizen of Massachusetts visiting South Carolina
would be entitled to many “civil” privileges and immunities, such
as the right to own property, but would not be entitled to vote in
South Carolina elections or exercise any other “political” rights.
Thus, a key distinction drawn by the drafters of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and the closely related Fourteenth Amendment was that
between civil and political rights; only the former were intended to
be safeguarded.7

Senator Stephen Douglas elaborated on this critical distinction
between “civil” and “political” rights in an 1850 speech on the floor of
Congress explaining that free blacks in Illinois were “protected in the
enjoyment of all their civil rights,” but were “not permitted to serve on
juries, or in the militia, or to vote at elections, or to exercise any other
political rights.”8 This distinction resurfaced frequently during the
debate on the 1866 Act. For instance, in order to deflect fears that
statutory language prohibiting discrimination in “civil rights and
immunities” might apply to voting, Representative Martin Russell
Thayer explained:

5 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819) (Constitutional provision may exist simply to
“remove all doubts” about a proposition that would be constitutionally correct even in the
provision’s absence.)
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
7 Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 203, 223 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (first citing Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27; then citing Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1244–46 (1992); and then citing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 162–63).
8 JAMES WASHINGTON SHEAHAN, THE LIFE OF STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 157 (New York,
Harper & Bros. 1860).
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[T]he words themselves are ‘civil rights and immunities,’ not
political privileges; and nobody can successfully contend that a bill
guarantying [sic] simply civil rights and immunities is a bill under
which you could extend the right of suffrage, which is a political
privilege and not a civil right.9

Representative Wilson of Iowa made a similar observation. In
discussing the proposed Act’s “civil rights and immunities” language,
Wilson promised colleagues that the legislation would not affect the
quintessential political rights of voting and jury service:
What do these terms [of the Act] mean? Do they mean that in all
things civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race
or color, shall be equal? By no means can they be so construed. Do
they mean that all citizens shall vote in the several States? No; for
suffrage is a political right which has been left under the control of
the several States, subject to the action of Congress only when it
becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of a republican form
of government. Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on
juries . . . . These are not civil rights or immunities. 10

Representative Lawrence, considering the same question,
endorsed Wilson’s interpretive sentiments, again characterizing voting
and jury service, along with office-holding, as a grouping of political
rights that were unaffected by the proposed legislation: the Act speaks
only to civil privileges and “does not affect any political right, as that
of suffrage, the right to sit on juries, hold office, &c.”11
This important distinction, drawn repeatedly during consideration of the Act, carried over to, and informed interpretation of, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was intended to preserve the political-civil line. As Professor
Harrison has observed, however “close [the] connection between [the
Fourteenth Amendment’s] privileges and immunities [of citizenship
language] and [the concept of] civil rights[,] neither was thought to
extend to political rights, such as voting or serving on juries.”12
The Equal Protection Clause was similarly understood at the time
of its enactment not to apply to political rights and not to require race
9 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer).
10 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115–22 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 2, at 119, 120; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 476, 599, 606, 1151, 1159, 1757, 1836, 3035 (1866) (statements of Sen. Trumbull, Reps.
Thayer, Kelley and Windom, and Sen. Henderson) (Civil Rights Bill does not encompass
political rights). For many more examples of this distinction during this era, see Amar, supra
note 7, at 222–37.
11 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832–37 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence)
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 2, at 147, 147.
12 John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1417 (1992).

2022]

TAKING (EQUAL VOTING) RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

1623

neutrality in voting. In language that addresses both the Equal
Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses, Fourteenth
Amendment coauthor Representative John Bingham reminded
opponents that “[t]he [proposed] amendment [as a whole] does not
give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating
suffrage in the several States.”13 Even more explicitly, Senator Jacob
Howard, when he introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Senate, reassured his fellow legislators that “the first section [which
includes the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Privileges and
Immunities and Due Process Clauses] of the proposed amendment
does not give to either of these classes [blacks or whites] the right of
voting.”14
And the broad phrasing of the Equal Protection Clause requires
this historical understanding. The Equal Protection Clause (similar to
the Due Process Clause but unlike the Privileges and Immunities
Clause) applies to all persons, not just citizens, and was intended to
afford some protection to noncitizens, including aliens. Yet if the
drafters intended the Equal Protection Clause to apply to aliens, then
freedom from voting discrimination could not have been considered
a denial of equal protection, for the Constitution did not prohibit
states from denying to aliens the right to vote and exercise other
political participatory rights on the basis of their alienage.
Seeing that the Fourteenth Amendment left a void in the
protection of political rights—such as voting, jury service, and officeholding—makes the existence and scope of the Fifteenth Amendment
is much easier to understand. One early version of what became the
Fifteenth Amendment set out clearly the drafters’ understanding that
the Amendment would fill that void, by providing straightforwardly
that “all provisions in the [C]onstitution or laws of any State whereby
any distinction is made in political or civil rights or privileges on
account of race . . . or color shall be inoperative and void.”15 The draft
went on to give “Congress . . . [the] power to make all laws necessary
and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States in every State
the same political rights and privileges.”16 Given this consistent and
well-understood emphasis on a package of political rights, the
Fifteenth Amendment, as I have explained in detail elsewhere, is

13 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530–45 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
as reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 2, at 170, 178.
14 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–67 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard) as
reprinted in LASH, Vol. 2, supra note 2, at 185, 188.
15 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1032 (1869) (statement of Sen. Fessenden).
16 Id.
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properly understood to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race not
just in voting at the ballot box, but also in the jury box.17
B. The Primary Arguments for Black Suffrage
The congressional debates surrounding the enfranchisement of
black Americans after the Civil War illustrated, in ways that would
foreshadow the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendment debates,
that voting rights involve both group interests and individual respect
and thereby further instrumental as well as dignitary objectives.18
Although the Supreme Court of the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries often suggests that governments may not constitutionally
suggest a commonality of interests and perspectives among black
voters, that modern doctrinal notion would have struck the Republican
sponsors and supporters of the Reconstruction Amendments as wrong
if not ridiculous.
To be sure, congressional supporters of black suffrage certainly
insisted that black men as individual citizens deserved the franchise as
individual freemen in a constitutional republic:
The individual rights argument for black suffrage was a critical
weapon in the Republican arsenal. According to this perspective,
every citizen had a natural right to vote and express his support for,
or opposition to, the government.
This was an essential
characteristic of the republican form of government guaranteed in
the Constitution and the distinguishing characteristic of the
democratic principle on which the United States had been
founded: that government derived its legitimacy from the consent
of the governed.19

Take, for instance, Senator Ferry’s assertion, in support of the
Fifteenth Amendment, that:
In this land Government does not make voters, but voters make the
Government. To vote, under every principle upon which our
Government is based, is a right of man because of his manhood,
and it comes to every citizen because of that truth in our
fundamental charter which proclaims that “governments derive all
their just powers from the consent of the governed.” And herein
lies the essential distinction between the European and the
American social theories. By the former, all political functions find
their source in the governing authority, and descend from it to the
subject. By the latter, all political functions originate from the
people, in whom alone is inherent sovereignty. The European
17 See Amar, supra note 7, at 223.
18 For much more elaboration on the observations that follow, see Vikram David Amar
& Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915 (1998).
19 Id. at 929–31 (footnotes omitted).
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Moreover, Republicans argued, blacks as individuals had earned
the right to vote by their service in the Union armies during the war.
No country with integrity could accept a person’s service in arms to
save the nation and then repudiate that same individual by denying
him the right to vote. Indeed, even an uneducated but loyal
emancipated slave, the argument ran, had a more deserving claim to
the right to vote than the traitors and rebels who made up much of the
voting white South. Representative Whittemore made the point in
these terms:
Shall we trust the pardoned rebel and not the patriot black man,
whose severed limb lies moldering at Fort Pillow, Port Hudson,
Olustee, Battery Wagner, or Petersburg mine? . . .
Give to the colored man his vote. . . . On staff and crutch he
stands demanding his rights; with scars and empty sleeves he pleads
an equal franchise; with uplifted hands, which have borne the
musket in the defense of your altars and your homes, of that flag,
emblem of freedom, of the future greatness of our Republic, he
asks, not social, but political equality.21

These individual rights and basic fairness arguments were
formidable, but by no means conclusive. The arguments in favor of
black suffrage thus demanded additional support.
When forced to confront the issue in Congress after the Civil War,
legislators determined that the right to vote necessarily involved
more than the honor of equal manhood, more than the dignity and
respect due a citizen, and even more than the power to express
one’s refusal to consent to a government deemed unjust. The
ballot was the “buckler and shield” of the poor, the weak, and the
despised. It provided not only respect, but “protection and justice.”
While it bestowed “dignity” on a voter, it also conferred “power”
and made “the Government his agent and protector instead of his
master and oppressor.”
....
Arguments extolling the instrumental value of the franchise to
the black communities in the South provided a new and powerful
20 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 858 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ferry).
21 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. 93 (1869) (statement of Rep. Whittemore).
The connection between prior military service and the right to vote was also invoked in the
ratification debates taking place in the state houses; “most Republican legislators simply
argued that if the Negro was good enough to fight and die for the Union during the war,
he was a good enough citizen to vote. The importance and influence of this argument
cannot be overestimated.” WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 81, 85 (1965) (citation omitted).
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foundation for granting freemen the vote. Foremost among these
arguments was the claim that black people needed the right to vote
in order to be able to protect themselves against the enactment of
pernicious laws by white southerners. Republicans anticipated that
the black populations in the South would be under siege and
believed that political influence and voting power would be their
sole means of defense. The only alternative to the franchise was the
continued military occupation of the South or, at a minimum,
continued intrusive civil intervention into the affairs of southern
states.22

It is obvious that this instrumental justification for expanding the
franchise presumed that black voters would act collectively in exercising political power. The individual black voter acting alone would
have minimal impact on political outcomes. Legislators anticipated
that the majority of whites, who harbored virulent ill will toward their
former slaves, would engage in racial bloc voting; only the votes of the
black masses could offset this white political aggression.
Finally, extending the franchise promised to benefit the Republican Party. New black voters were anticipated to vote Republican and,
in doing so, would ensure that men who were disloyal to the Union
would not lead the postwar governments of the southern states. And
Republican legislators did not hesitate to openly acknowledge this
partisan purpose. Senator Sumner, surely as devoted to black suffrage
as a matter of justice and right as any member of the Senate, repeatedly
emphasized the value of the black vote to Republican Party
ascendancy. In 1869, Sumner exhorted his colleagues as follows:
I do not depart from the proprieties of this occasion when I show
how completely the course I now propose harmonizes with the
requirements of the political party to which I belong. Believing
most sincerely that the Republican party, in its objects, is identical
with country and with mankind . . . I cannot willingly see this
agency lose the opportunity of confirming its supremacy. . . .
Pardon me; but if you are not moved by considerations of justice
under the Constitution, then I appeal to that humbler motive which
is found in the desire for success. Do this and you will assure the
triumph of all that you can most desire. Party, country, mankind
will be elevated . . . .23
22 Amar & Brownstein, supra note 18, at 938–40 (citations omitted) (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1867) (statement of Rep. Ashley)).
23 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 904 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner). On
an earlier occasion, Sumner had emphasized the political benefits to the Republican Party
in supporting a bill to provide blacks the vote in both northern and southern states in
particularly partisan terms:
I appeal to Senators to look at this measure as a great measure of expediency as
well as of justice. How are you going to settle this question in the loyal States?
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Republican aspirations regarding the support of black voters, in
both the North and South, rested on a solid political foundation.
Democrats’ opposition to black suffrage would certainly have
cemented the allegiance of the new voters to the party of Lincoln.
Moreover, the bitter history and legacy of the war and slavery caused
many blacks to openly proclaim their Republican allegiance.
“‘We would vote the way we shot,’ declared one Negro. Another
predicted that Negroes would vote Republican ‘as naturally as water
flows downward.’” In Pennsylvania, the President of the State
Equal Rights League, an association of black citizens, “urged that
the organization become a political one, aligned with the
Republicans, by which the ‘power of the colored voters of the state
of Pennsylvania can be used as a unit.’”24

Historians debate whether Republican supporters of the Fifteenth
Amendment were primarily motivated by the partisan goal of
preserving the political power of the Republican Party or by a more
idealistic commitment to giving black citizens political weapons to
protect their communities against hostile white forces. But both
arguments are grounded on a collective understanding of black
political interests being, as a general matter, distinct from those of
whites.
Moreover, in addition to these arguments, members of Congress
demonstrated their recognition of the collective political unity of black
Americans in other ways. For example, both proponents and
opponents of black suffrage assumed that black voters would support
black candidates for office. Democrats vigorously opposed legislation
giving black residents of the District of Columbia the right to vote
because they feared that the large number of black residents would
almost certainly elect black municipal leaders. This potential for black
Here are Delaware, Maryland . . . and Kentucky, in each of which this measure is
the only salvation of Union citizens. Then there are other States like Pennsylvania, where this measure will give at once—I am speaking now on the question of
expediency—twenty thousand votes to the Union cause. There is Indiana, too,
where this bill will settle the suffrage question. I will say nothing about Iowa.
There is Wisconsin.
....
. . . . There is Connecticut. Let us secure three thousand votes in Connecticut for
the good cause. You can secure them by act of Congress. A little, short act of
Congress can determine the political fortunes of Connecticut for an indefinite
period by securing three thousand additional votes to the right side. There is
New York, also, where the bill would have the same excellent, beneficent
influence.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
24 Amar & Brownstein, supra note 18, at 946 (quoting GILLETTE, supra note 21, at 119,
132–33 (1965)).
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political dominance rendered black suffrage in the District even more
dangerous and unacceptable to Democrats than extending the
franchise in southern or northern states, where the black population
was relatively smaller and more dispersed. One Democrat stated this
argument bluntly:
Sir, there are about thirty-five thousand of this class of people
[(blacks)] now in this District I am told. There are about one
hundred thousand inhabitants I am informed in the District. Pass
this bill, and this “paradise,” as the District was said to be when the
bill giving freedom to the slaves of this District was passed, will be
their paradise indeed, and in less than two years from this time it
will be flooded by negroes from all parts of the country, and your
mayors and your corporation officers will be composed of
negroes. . . .
. . . . Sir, it may do very well for gentlemen representing States in
which there are not enough of the negro race to make mile-posts
along the public roads to vote for a measure of this kind, because it
is hardly within the range of possibility that any great amount of
injury can result to such States; but where the races are so nearly
equal [in number], and where it is reasonable to suppose that the
“paradise” opened up for negroes will be filled with more negroes
than whites, I hold that I should be derelict in duty to my own race,
which I believe to be superior in all respects to the negro race, if I
were to vote to give them the right of suffrage under any
circumstances whatever.25

II.

TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT—TEXT AND JUSTIFICATION

The Twenty-Sixth Amendment was passed and ratified in 1971.
The amendment process gained momentum after the Court in Oregon
v. Mitchell held, by a 5–4 vote, that a federal statute which prohibited
age discrimination in voting against persons over eighteen years of age
in elections for state and federal offices could not constitutionally be
applied to elections for state offices.26
The operative text of the Amendment is, for citizens eighteen
years or older, nearly identical to that of the Fifteenth, with the word
“age” replacing “race, color or previous condition of servitude” in the
prohibitory language of the Amendment. The Twenty-Sixth thus
provides: “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the

25 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 45–46 (1866) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
26 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970); see S. CONST. AMEND. SUBCOMM., 92nd CONG., LOWERING
THE VOTING AGE TO 18: A FIFTY-STATE SURVEY OF THE COSTS AND OTHER PROBLEMS OF
DUAL-AGE VOTING 1 (Comm. Print 1971).
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United States or by any State on account of age.”27 Two aspects of this
text cannot be overemphasized. First, the striking parallelism between
it and the Fifteenth (and the Nineteenth as well) was obviously
intentional. That is, the Twenty-Sixth self-consciously tracks the
language of the Fifteenth (and Nineteenth) Amendment(s), with the
same intended consequences.
As prominent House member Claude Pepper announced in an
uncontested statement explaining the scope of the Amendment:
“What we propose to do . . . is exactly what we did in . . . the 15th
amendment and . . . the 19th amendment. Therefore, it seems to me
that this proposed amendment is perfectly in consonance with those
precedents.”28 In the same vein, as to the sweep of the proposed
amendment, hear the words of Representative Poff:
What does the proposed constitutional amendment accomplish? . . . [I]t guarantees that citizens who are 18 years of age or
older shall not be discriminated against on account of age. Just as
the 15th amendment prohibits racial discrimination in voting and
just as the 19th amendment prohibits sex discrimination in voting,
the proposed amendment would prohibit age discrimination in
voting . . . .29

Second, as these passages make clear and as was true with the
Fifteenth (and Nineteenth), the Twenty-Sixth Amendment does not
merely confer the franchise on any particular group of people, but
instead outlaws discriminatory treatment based on a particular
criterion. Thus, the operative text of the Twenty-Sixth does not say
merely that each state shall reduce its voting age to eighteen (just at
the operative words of the Fifteenth do not merely say that adult black
men shall enjoy the franchise) but instead provides that the right of
persons eighteen or older to vote cannot be denied or abridged on
account of age: textually, then, age cannot be used as a criterion for
withholding the core political rights.
Moreover, as to what attentive folks at enactment understood as
to scope, the text of the Twenty-Sixth’s reference to the “right to vote”
was, as was true of the Fifteenth, a shorthand for a broad package of
political-participation rights. For anyone who may not have been sure,
Representative Poff was very explicit about the way in which the
Amendment was meant to facilitate the fullest possible political
participation. Addressing the House and quoting the committee
report, he described the Amendment as “confer[ring] a plenary right
on citizens 18 years of age or older to participate in the political

27
28
29

U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
See 117 CONG. REC. 7539 (1971) (statement of Rep. Pepper).
Id. at 7534 (statement of Rep. Poff).
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process, free of discrimination on account of age.”30 Representative
Poff also explained, in an address to his fellow House members, that
“[t]he ‘right to vote’ is a constitutional phrase of art whose scope
embraces the entire process by which the people make their political
choices.”31 Thus, noted Poff, unlike the congressional statute that was
at issue in Mitchell, the Amendment was not limited to particular kinds
of voting, but rather applied to nominating activities, and even to
voting by which voters make law, as in the case of an initiative.32
Indeed, the only limitations he saw on the “plenary right” were those
which were already built into the Constitution and which the TwentySixth Amendment did not purport to amend—the age limitations for
elective office.33
Thus, the text and the intended application of the Twenty-Sixth
builds on and seeks to mirror the Fifteenth. So too the reasons offered
in support of prohibiting age discrimination in voting track the kinds
of reasons offered for prohibiting race discrimination. First were
arguments about respecting the rights of individual adults who were
worthy of exercising the franchise. President Nixon’s deputy attorney
general spoke for his boss by saying:
America’s 10 million young people between the ages of 18 and 21
are better equipped today than ever in the past to be entrusted with
all of the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship. Their wellinformed intelligence, enthusiastic interest, and desire to
participate in public affairs at all levels exemplifies the highest
qualities of mature citizenship.34

Second, again tracking the Fifteenth, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s case featured arguments about the moral imperative of
allowing people eighteen years and older to vote given the substantial
involvement of young persons in recent military service, namely the
Vietnam War.35 And finally, the reasons offered for inclusion of
younger persons in the voting process drew on instrumental
justifications that parallel the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment
juror exclusion jurisprudence, which requires that a group bring
30 Id. at 7535 (statement of Rep. Poff) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-37, at 7 (1971)).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See id.
34 S. CONST. AMEND. SUBCOMM., 92nd CONG., supra note 26, at 9; see also id. at 10
(quoting Senator Kennedy’s testimony that “the time has come . . . to bring American youth
into the mainstream of our political process. To me, this is the most important single
principle we can pursue as a nation if we are to succeed in bringing our youth into full and
lasting participation in our institutions of democratic government”); 117 CONG. REC. 7546
(1971) (statement of Rep. Ford) (proposed amendment “affords today’s youth a great
opportunity to . . . make its voice heard at all levels of Government”).
35 See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 7549 (1971).

2022]

TAKING (EQUAL VOTING) RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

1631

something distinctive to the deliberative process to be found
cognizable. The Senate report on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
observed:
[T]hese younger voters should be given the right to full
participation in our political system because they will contribute a
great deal to our society. . . . [T]he student unrest of recent
years . . . reflects the interest and concern of today’s youth over the
important issues of our day. The deep commitment of those 18 to
21 years old is often the idealism which Senator Barry Goldwater
has said “is exactly what we need more of in the country . . . .”36

If young people are mature enough to be responsible and distinct
enough to contribute something special—an idealism that comes from
youth—the case for including them free from age discrimination was
similarly compelling to the case made for the Fifteenth Amendment.
III.

FAILURE TO TAKE THE TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT SERIOUSLY

And yet, people continue to be discriminated against on the basis
of their age when it comes to political rights. Let’s start with jury
service eligibility, one of the key components of the political rights
package included in the intended scope of the Fifteenth Amendment,
the Nineteenth Amendment, and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Race
and gender are acknowledged by the Supreme Court as impermissible
bases on which to exclude some from serving on juries,37 but age has
not been. Thus, lawyers and judges continue to exercise peremptory
challenges based on age,38 and there is no indication this will change
anytime soon.
Even with regard to juror eligibility itself, age continues to play a
constitutionally impermissible role. A number of states continue to
make twenty or twenty-one (rather than eighteen, the cutoff included
in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s text) the age at which people are
eligible to serve on juries39 in what would seem to be a blatant violation
of the very words of enactment. Moreover, and more pervasively, states
often draw their juror rolls from voting records (which is innocuous
enough) but fail to update the juror rolls with any reasonable
frequency. As a result, even in states where young adults are technically

36 S. CONST. AMEND. SUBCOMM., 92nd CONG., REP. ON PASSAGE & RATIFICATION OF
TWENTY-SIXTH AMEND. 2 (Comm. Print 1971).
37 On race, see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). On gender,
see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
38 See, e.g., Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Role of Age in Jury
Selection and Trial Outcomes, 57 J.L. & ECON. 1001 (2014).
39 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (1972); MO. REV. STAT. § 494.425 (1989).
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eligible to serve on juries, their names and addresses are not included
in the juror databases until they are twenty or older, meaning adults
between eighteen to twenty—persons fully permitted to be free from
age
discrimination
in
political
rights—are
drastically
underrepresented on juries.40 This underrepresentation directly
implicates some of the core arguments that drove enactment of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment in the first place. The arguments about
moral and military worthiness and group perspective discussed above
apply to the jury service question just as to the ballot-box voting
question: just as it might be thought unfair for young adults to fight
and die in a war without being able to voice their opposition to it in
federal and state elections, so too it might be unfair to prosecute them
for evading the draft or protesting the war without meaningfully
allowing their peers to be on juries in those cases.
To be sure, this latter problem may be distinguishable from the
problem raised in states that simply don’t confer jury-service eligibility
until age twenty or older on the ground that the latter involves facial
discrimination whereas the former might seem more like a problem of
disparate impact (which under general constitutional doctrine
requires a finding of invidious intent before it is actionable). But
notice that as to political-rights participation and race, at least with
ballot-box voting, the Supreme Court has not infrequently found
invidious intent to exist simply because of a pronounced disparate
impact, and invalidated measures that were race neutral on their face
simply because of their exclusionary effect.41 Moreover, imagine that
a state recognized that people were eligible to register to vote upon
turning eighteen, but had only periodic windows of “open
registration” (akin to open enrollment in health plans) such that many
people who turned eighteen had to wait a year or more for the next
window in order to vindicate their right. That, too, could be said to be
facially age-neutral, but would anyone doubt that it violated the
essence of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment?
And yet perhaps no one should be surprised that age
discrimination in juries persists unabated since lower federal courts
don’t seem to be able to understand and apply the clear text of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment even in ballot-box voting cases, the core
target of the antidiscrimination norm.
Consider, for example, a recent ruling by a divided three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concerning
race-based differential access to mail-in ballots. In a world of razor40 See Amar, supra note 7, at 211–15.
41 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982). See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1119–26 (1989).

2022]

TAKING (EQUAL VOTING) RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

1633

thin statewide elections in purple states, cases like this one could easily
affect national election outcomes. Above all that, it was clearly wrongly
decided, and illustrates how some judges have terrible interpretive
instincts when it comes to navigating the tricky but ultra-important
voting rights realm, especially in the domain of age.
The case, Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott (one of many, unrelated
cases bearing that name), involved a challenge to a relatively simple
Texas statute that, as the Fifth Circuit put it: “permits early voting by
mail [but only] for voters who: (1) anticipate being absent from their
county of residence; (2) are sick or disabled; (3) are 65 years of age or
older; or (4) are confined to jail.”42 The third category of the statute
thus prefers people who are 65 or older, giving them an entitlement to
early voting by mail that younger persons do not enjoy unless they
satisfy additional criteria.
Plaintiffs challenged this law as violative of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution, which straightforwardly provides, as
noted earlier, that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.”43
On the face of things, the plaintiffs’ challenge would seem strong.
Texas definitely treats people under sixty-five differently with respect
to voting “on account of [their] age.” (Indeed, no one even tried to
deny that Texas was differentiating between would-be voters due to, or
on the basis of, their age.) Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit decided the
plaintiffs’ Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim failed.
To its credit, the Fifth Circuit did not embrace the position,
advanced by the defendants, that the claim should lose because the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment does no more than lower the voting age to
eighteen. As noted earlier, this reading would be impossible to square
with the Amendment’s clear text, which does more than alter the
minimum voting age; it prohibits discrimination “on account of age”
against anyone eighteen or over in the right to vote.
Why, then, did two judges rule against the claim? Because, they
said, the statute did not “deny or abridge” the right of anyone under
sixty-five to vote.44 The court interpreted “abridgment,” by reference
to some dictionaries and a few cases not on point, as the taking away
or reduction of meaningful voting liberties that someone enjoyed
before the enactment in question was adopted:

42 Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001–.004 (West 2020)).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
44 Tex. Democratic Party, 978 F.3d at 192.
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Rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments, we hold that an election law
abridges a person’s right to vote for the purposes of the TwentySixth Amendment only if it makes voting more difficult for that
person than it was before the law was enacted or enforced. . . .
. . . [A] law that makes it easier for others to vote does not
abridge any person’s right to vote for the purposes of the TwentySixth Amendment.45

Here, because the Texas statutory backdrop was that no early
voting by mail was originally allowed—exceptions to that starting point
were made beginning in 1917, culminating in the entitlement at issue
today of persons over sixty-five in 1975, after the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment had been ratified—persons under sixty-five had never
enjoyed early voting privileges, so they lost nothing by the conferral of
such privileges to older voters but not to younger ones.46 Again, the
idea is that giving something to older folks takes nothing away from
younger folks.
This reasoning is flawed for many reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit’s
approach is open to seemingly arbitrary outcomes. The panel’s
reasoning suggests the result would have been different—even though
the effect and words of the statute would have been the same—had
early voting been the rule rather than the exception. In other words,
if everybody had enjoyed early voting prior to 1975, and in that year,
Texas revised the statute to limit it to only persons over sixty-five, now
all of a sudden, the rights of younger folks have been abridged?
A related problem—one that the panel mentioned but did not
address other than to say courts can manage such difficulties47—is that
of manipulation. Suppose Texas wants to make it harder for young
people to vote but has in place a law that allows everyone to vote early.
Exempting only young people would, as just suggested, constitute an
abridgment in the eyes of the panel. So what should Texas do? Repeal
early voting for all, wait a while, and then reinstate it only for older
persons—voila! How is a court to know when such a sequence reflects
a good-faith effort at legislative experimentation, or a cynical effort to
circumvent a manipulable test? This is an especially dicey task in an
era when the message the current Supreme Court generally sends is
that inquiry into legislative motivations is to be avoided, and that
statutes, rules, and executive orders should be analyzed on their face
and by their operation.
But beyond (and much more important than) these practical
concerns, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is completely wide of the mark

45
46
47

Id. at 190–91.
Id. at 192 (citing In re State, 602 S.W.3d 549, 558 (Tex. 2020)).
Id. at 191.
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because it ignores the equality dimension—which is the essence—of
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. The words of and history behind the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment make clear that its proponents thought not
only that young people were responsible enough to vote, but also that
they were—as a class—equally valuable and entitled as older folks are to
vote.48 Putting aside what the “right to vote” the Court has discussed in
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment may mean, the voting
rights covered by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (and by the earlier
specific voting rights amendments—the Fifteenth and Nineteenth—
which served as intellectual and textual templates for the TwentySixth) involve not an absolute right to vote, but a right to be treated
equally with respect to the vote.
That is why, as discussed earlier, Representative Richard Poff,
twenty-year Virginia Republican member of the House and one of the
leaders behind the Amendment, described the Amendment as
conferring “a plenary right on citizens 18 years of age or older to
participate in the political process, free of discrimination on account of
age.”49
And that is why the language of the Amendment is written the way
it is. It bears repeating yet again that the Amendment does not say
merely that every state shall reduce its voting age to eighteen. Rather,
it provides that the right of persons eighteen or older to vote cannot
be abridged on account of age: textually, then, age cannot be used as
a criterion for regulating the core political right of voting, just as race
and sex cannot, under the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.
For the purposes of all these specific voting rights amendments, the
meaning of “abridge” does not and cannot be limited to “take away or
reduce what was enjoyed before,” but also has to include “deprive”
(another dictionary definition of abridge) or “withhold” on unequal
terms. In other words, although the Fifth Circuit may have been
correct in suggesting that the word “abridge” implies a baseline, the
baseline need not be a moment in the past; instead it can—indeed
must—be what other people are currently receiving on account of
their race or sex (or age).
Even the Fifth Circuit acknowledged, as it had to, that “[t]he
language and structure of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment mirror the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments”50 and that it
is proper, in interpreting a part of the Constitution, to “focus [on] . . .
how the same or at least similar terms that also appeared elsewhere in

48 See supra Part II.
49 117 CONG. REC. 7535 (1971) (statement of Rep. Poff) (emphasis added) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 92-37, at 7 (1971)).
50 Tex. Democratic Party, 978 F.3d at 183.
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the Constitution ha[ve] been interpreted.”51 Indeed, comparison to
the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments led the Fifth Circuit to
conclude that plaintiffs had individual rights under the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment such that they could sue at all (a preliminary issue the
court addressed).52
Given the obviously (and admittedly) intentional patterning of
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment on the Fifteenth and Nineteenth, the
case should have been a very easy one. The Fifth Circuit judges need
merely have asked—and this really should have been enough to decide
the case—what would happen if Texas had never permitted early
voting by mail but then extended that option to whites but not blacks,
or to men but not women. Would there be a question in anyone’s
mind that the State had in these events violated the Fifteenth or
Nineteenth Amendments, respectively? It would be absurd to say these
laws did not “abridge” the freedom to vote within the meaning of the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments simply because the laws
weren’t taking anything away that blacks or women had previously
enjoyed, but instead were simply giving something new to other
groups. Indeed, the clear unconstitutionality of these laws would be
evident even if early voting by mail weren’t a particularly useful option
to have (which it is). A law that changed the preexisting (uniform)
closing time for the voting polls such that whites but not blacks were
given two additional minutes to vote would undeniably abridge voting
rights of blacks and blatantly violate the Fifteenth Amendment.
The short of it is that when a state uses a facial classification based
on race, sex, or age to condition access to voting in general or to any
method of voting in particular, the government abridges the voting
equality rights explicitly written into the Constitution. And unlike
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment’s voting rights jurisprudence,
we needn’t even ask what the “standard of review” is, or what interests
the state might have to justify its differential treatment. As the
Supreme Court observed in the Fifteenth Amendment context,
“race. . . . [c]olor and previous condition of servitude, too, are
[simply] forbidden criteria or classifications.”53
The Fifth Circuit intimated that plaintiffs may, on remand, be able
to argue they have a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, in which case the strength of the government’s
interest might be relevant (although it’s hard to imagine the
government ever having a good reason to withhold any voting access
on account of race, sex, or age).54 But the Fourteenth Amendment
51
52
53
54

See id. at 184.
See id. at 183–84.
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000).
See Tex. Democratic Party, 978 F.3d at 193.
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(under which age is ordinarily not a suspect classification) is simply
beside the point. The voting equality amendments—including the
Twenty-Sixth—cover voting much more explicitly than does the
Fourteenth Amendment, the history of which suggests it was not
designed to apply to political rights at all.55 Plaintiffs clearly should
have won under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, regardless of what
claim they might have been able to make in its absence. (And it is
frankly bizarre that the Fifth Circuit even technically leaves open on
remand the possibility that plaintiffs can pursue their Fourteenth
Amendment claim—how on earth could they win on the Fourteenth
and lose on the Twenty-Sixth?)
None of this is to say difficult questions might not arise
concerning what “abridge” means in the context of laws that do not
overtly make use of age (or race or gender) classifications but that have
a disparate impact against groups along any of these lines. For
example, if a state were to close its polls at 6:00 p.m. (which would be
earlier than other states) and there were evidence that such a decision
adversely impacted racial minorities or women or young adults in
particular (because of the jobs they tended to have), there would be
complicated questions of what level of improper intent a plaintiff
challenging such a law would have to prove. As Professor Daniel Ortiz
pointed out a few decades ago, in the voting rights context the intent
requirement the Court normally insists on in the equality-rights realm
has been watered down such that the Court has been much more
willing to accept a disparate impact theory than in other areas of equal
protection law.56
But in the Abbott case we needn’t even worry about such nuances.
The law overtly discriminates against people based on their age. And
that should have been the end of it.
The Fifth Circuit’s failure to understand any of this, and also to
appreciate the group-equality nature of voting and voting rights, is
extremely troubling, and somewhat surprising. The right to vote is an
individual entitlement, to be sure. But voting is a hybrid right; the
reason the Constitution singles out certain criteria, and the groups that
are defined by those criteria, is that voting is more than an individual
act—it involves a collective effort to exert political power to elect
groups’ preferred candidates and enact groups’ preferred policies.
There are obviously known (or knowable) partisan implications—both
in the 1970s when the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and the Texas law
were enacted and today as well—that ensue from giving any particular
groups (including groups defined by age) greater or fewer voting

55
56

See supra notes 6–15 and accompanying text.
See Ortiz, supra note 39, at 1126–30.
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options; that is one reason why, as noted above, even certain disparate
impacts alone are sometimes problematic in the voting rights arena.
And overt, facial discrimination against persons—on the grounds
explicitly identified by the Constitution’s clear words as
impermissible—is impossible to countenance. And yet a Fifth Circuit
panel did so.
Nor is Texas alone in this blatantly unconstitutional age discrimination in voting. A similarly illegal aspect of Georgia’s election system
could easily have tipped the balance in the U.S. Senate runoff elections
held there a year ago after the November 2020 election did not
generate winners.57 Georgia explicitly makes it easier for older folks to
vote than younger folks. In particular, Georgia allows persons sixty-five
years and older to get absentee ballots for all elections in an election
cycle with a single request, whereas younger voters must request
absentee ballots separately for the primary election, general election,
runoff election, etc. In this way, Georgia facilitates the absentee voting
device (which we saw in recent years is a very important method of
voting) for older voters more than for younger voters.58
Why does age inequality matter so much? Because the Framers of
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment fully understood that older voters and
younger voters vote differently. Take the recent presidential election.
According to exit polls, President Trump lost big among voters under
forty-five, broke even among voters forty-five to sixty-four, and won
significantly (by five points) among voters sixty-five or older.59 The
only age demographic group he carried in a significant way was older
voters (a group which, it bears noting, has more whites and fewer
blacks relative to other age groups).60
IV.

COUNTERARGUMENTS?

What can be said by way of counterargument on behalf of the Fifth
Circuit? To be frank, not a whole lot. To be sure, the phrase “denied
or abridged” has to be interpreted, and not everything that creates the
smallest disparate impact on account of race, gender, or age in voting
is necessarily unconstitutional. But, as noted above, no sane person
would dispute that a law that allowed whites but not blacks automatic
access to absentee ballots would “den[y] or abridge[] . . . on account
57 See, e.g., Nathan Layne, Joseph Ax & Rich McKay, Democrats Win One Georgia Runoff
and Lead in Second, Moving Closer to U.S. Senate Control, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www
.reuters.com/world/us/democrats-win-one-georgia-runoff-lead-second-moving-closer-ussenate-control-2021-01-05/ [https://perma.cc/GSY8-VP2Q].
58 See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-381 (2021); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 183-1-14.01 (2022).
59 Exit Poll Results and Analysis for the 2020 Presidential Election, WASH. POST, (Dec. 14,
2020, 12:29 PM).
60 Id.
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of race.”61 So unless “deny or abridge” means something different for
age than for race (or gender), the Fifth Circuit’s position was frivolous.
And as far as I know, while “deny or abridge” may be a term of art,
there is nothing in the history behind any of the three Amendments
(Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth) to suggest a different
general meaning.
Second, some folks might point out (as I did above) that legislative
classifications based on age are generally treated differently (and with
less suspicion) than classifications based on race and gender under the
Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps because in many settings age is a
more reasonable basis of government classification than are race and
gender.62 True as that is, it is beside the point. The voting rights
amendments speak specifically to political rights and lay down a flat
prohibition on certain criteria. Under the Fifteenth Amendment, for
example (and thus presumptively under the Nineteenth and TwentyFourth), courts need not wade into the thicket of “standards of review”
and “tiers of scrutiny,” and the like. As the Court has made clear,
“race. . . . [c]olor and previous condition of servitude, too, are
[simply] forbidden criteria or classifications”63 in the political-rights
realm. So too is age (and sex). These criteria have been
constitutionally recognized to correlate with certain group
perspectives and have been taken off the constitutional table by
specific text. Putting aside whether the Court’s application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the voting realm has been historically
grounded and correct, what’s the point of having specific text in the
Fifteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments if it is not going to be
respected?
All of this brings me to the third counterargument, one that
recognizes that the Constitution itself does treat age differently than
race or gender in the political rights realm. For federal elective officeholding, the Constitution itself sets up age discrimination: persons
under twenty-five cannot serve in the House, persons under thirty
cannot serve in the Senate, and persons under thirty-five cannot serve
in the White House.64
If, as I have argued earlier, the “right to vote” is a shorthand for
the right to vote in ballot boxes and on juries as well as the right to
hold office (to be voted for, in essence), how do we square the TwentySixth Amendment with the preexisting recognition that age ought to
be able to be taken into account by government in regulating the
political rights realm? One answer might be that the Twenty-Sixth
61
62
63
64

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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Amendment implicitly repealed those parts of Articles I and II that set
up age requirements for federal elective office. But I reject that
reading, largely because the drafters and proponents of the TwentySixth Amendment made clear that in their minds elective officeholding was the one exception to the antidiscrimination norm they
were enshrining. So, for example, in Representative Poff’s mind, the
right to be free from age discrimination in voting—that is, in
“choos[ing]”—did not call into question the validity of age
requirements for elective office “candidate[s]”—those who seek “to be
a choice.”65
And here we see how the presumptive linkage between voting and
office-holding could be broken by clear constitutional text to the
contrary—presumptions are just that, they can be strong but are not
insurmountable. But with that single, textually clear exception,66 the
freedom from age discrimination in the right to vote was understood
as having subsumed all political voting activities. And unlike elective
office-holding, there is nothing unusual about absentee-ballot access
that the Fifth Circuit or anyone else could point to that would justify
not applying the basic command of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in
ballot-voting settings.
CONCLUSION
In twenty-first-century America, age—like race and gender—is a
durable and often outcome-determinative characteristic in voting and
other political-rights behavior. Framers and adopters of the TwentySixth Amendment, rightfully viewing their work as the intellectual and

65 117 CONG. REC. 7535 (1971) (statement of Rep. Poff); see also id. at 7540 (statement
of Rep. Wiggins) (proposed amendment does not prevent states “if they wish[,] [from]
follow[ing] the Federal pattern and impos[ing] more restrictive age standards . . . for
holding any elective office”). And it is no accident that the Constitution provides age
requirements for federal elective offices but not for juries. The elective office exception to
the “plenary” right to be free from age discrimination in political participation makes sense
when we remember, as Senator Edmunds observed over a hundred years ago, that political
elective offices are in some important respects different than juries, which were intended
to be filled by a much broader class of the electorate. See 3 CONG. REC. 1866 (1875)
(remarks of Sen. Edmunds). Indeed, juries were to be populated by persons—rotating and
common—who would not normally have an opportunity to be elective office holders.
Treating jurors differently than elected officials also makes sense in light of the temporary
nature of jurors’ service. Like early militiamen, jurors are ordinary citizens, not permanent
government officials on the government payroll.
66 In this regard, there is a strong argument to be made that Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which refers to voting rather than office-holding, was effectively
altered by the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, such that states that deny the
franchise to any persons eighteen or older (rather than just men twenty-one or older)
should have their representation in Congress reduced.
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moral descendant of the Fifteenth Amendment, understood this
modern political reality and chose their words carefully and with clear
intended consequences. It is high time courts and other policymakers
take seriously this constitutional addition from fifty years ago, just as
they need to continue to honor the Reconstruction enactments from
a century earlier, on which the Twenty-Sixth Amendment built.
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